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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
E. MARLOWE GOBLE, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. ] 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE ] 
INSURANCE COMPANY, ] 
Defendant/Respondent. ] 
i Case No. 940268-CA 
i Priority No. 15 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over plaintiff's appeal pursuant 
to Utah Constitution, Article VIII, and Utah Code Ann, § 78-2-2. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Did the trial court properly construe the State Farm 
insurance policy as allowing State Farm to discharge its obliga-
tion by fully repairing the physical damage to plaintiff's 
vehicle without paying plaintiff for the alleged diminution in 
value to the vehicle? This is a legal determination for which 
the court gives no deference, but rather reviews for correctness. 
Standard Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Kirkbride, 821 P.2d 1136, 
1137 (Utah 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordi-
nances, or rules relevant to this appeal. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs vehicle was damaged by plaintiff's child. 
Plaintiff made a claim for collision coverage under an insurance 
policy purchased from defendant State Farm. State Farm fully 
repaired all of the physical damage to plaintiff's automobile and 
returned plaintiff's vehicle to its original physical condition. 
None of the repairs were defective. Nonetheless, plaintiff 
claims that, even though the vehicle was fully repaired, the cash 
value of the vehicle is diminished because of its status as a 
previously-damaged automobile. Plaintiff demanded that State 
Farm pay plaintiff for the alleged diminution in value. State 
Farm denied plaintiff's demand for coverage on the grounds that 
the State Farm policy does not extend coverage for diminution in 
value when the physical damage to the vehicle has been fully 
repaired. 
Plaintiff filed suit, claiming that the State Farm policy 
extends coverage for diminution in value. Plaintiff eventually 
moved for partial summary judgment on this issue. Defendant 
State Farm opposed the motion and filed its own motion for 
summary judgment. After full briefing and a hearing, the trial 
court found that diminution in value is not a covered loss under 
the State Farm policy and granted summary judgment in State 
Farm's favor. Plaintiff filed this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of this case are not in dispute. Defendant State 
Farm moved for summary judgment without supporting affidavits, as 
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authorized by Rule 56(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Plaintiff did not contest any of the facts alleged in defendant's 
memorandum. Consequently, each of the facts asserted by defen-
dant were deemed to be admitted. The relevant facts asserted in 
defendant's summary judgment memorandum are set forth in para-
graphs 1 through 11 below. The remaining paragraphs of fact 
summarize the events of the trial court. 
1. At all times material hereto, plaintiff was the owner 
of a 1991 Mercedes automobile (hereinafter the "vehicle"). (R. 
33) . 
2. At all times material hereto, plaintiff's vehicle was 
insured by defendant State Farm. (R. 33). 
3. On or about June 27, 1992, plaintiff's son lost control 
of plaintiff's vehicle while driving down a canyon road, causing 
the vehicle to wreck and sustain significant damage. (R. 33) . 
4. Plaintiff submitted a claim to State Farm for the 
damage to his vehicle. (R. 33). 
5. The physical damage to plaintiff's vehicle was repair-
able. (R. 33). 
6. Defendant paid to have plaintiff's vehicle repaired. 
(R. 33). 
7. The repairs restored plaintiff's vehicle to its former 
physical condition and were not defective. (R. 33) . 
8. Plaintiff alleges that, although the repairs may have 
restored his vehicle to its former physical condition, the 
repairs did not restore plaintiff's vehicle to its former market 
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value. Plaintiff claims that the market value of his vehicle has 
diminished because of the accident, even though all of the 
physical damage caused by the accident has been repaired. (R. 
33) . 
9. Plaintiff made a demand upon State Farm for the diminu-
tion in value of his vehicle, which is calculated as the differ-
ence between the market value of the vehicle immediately prior to 
tne accident and the market value of the vehicle following 
repairs. (R. 33-34). 
10. State Farm denied plaintiff's demand on the grounds 
that plaintiff's diminution in value claim is not a covered loss 
under the State Farm policy. (R. 34). 
11. Plaintiff sued State Farm, demanding "judgment against 
defendant for the amount of the loss which is the difference 
between the value of the automobile on the date of the loss and 
its value immediately after repairs were completed. . . ." 
(Complaint, p. 2.; R. 34). 
12. Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment, seeking 
an order declaring that the appropriate measure of plaintiff's 
damages was the difference in the market value of plaintiff's 
vehicle immediately prior to the accident and immediately after 
the repairs to the vehicle had been completed. (R. 17). 
13. Defendant opposed plaintiff's motion and filed a 
counter-motion for summary judgment, asserting that, under the 
policy, State Farm's liability was limited to the cost of 
repairing plaintiff's vehicle. (R. 30) . 
4 
14. The court heard arguments on the parties' motions and 
concluded that the State Farm policy was clear and unambiguous. 
The court further found that State Farm's liability under the 
policy was limited to the cost of repairing plaintiff's vehicle 
and dismissed plaintiff's complaint on the merits with prejudice. 
15. From the trial court's award of summary judgment to 
defendant State Farm, plaintiff filed this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant State Farm fully repaired the damage to plain-
tiff's vehicle. The repairs were not defective in any manner and 
fully restored plaintiff's vehicle to its pre-accident condition. 
By repairing plaintiff's vehicle in this manner, State Farm fully 
satisfied its contractual obligation to plaintiff. The insurance 
policy plainly and unambiguously states that: "The limit of 
[State Farm's] liability . . . is the lower of . . . the actual 
cash value [of the vehicle], or . . . the cost of repair or 
replacement." (State Farm Policy; emphasis added). 
Plaintiff ignores the clear limitation on coverage quoted 
above and argues that State Farm must do more than repair his 
vehicle. Plaintiff claims that the value of his vehicle is 
diminished because of its status as a previously-damaged 
automobile and that State Farm is liable for this alleged 
diminution in value. 
Because there is no language in the insurance policy to sup-
port plaintiff's claim, plaintiff instead cites to cases from 
other jurisdictions. This case is governed by the language of 
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the insurance contract, and not by the decisions of other courts. 
In any event, in situations where repairs can fully restore a 
damaged vehicle to its original physical condition, the courts 
overwhelmingly hold that an insurer can properly discharge its 
contractual obligation by electing to repair the vehicle. The 
majority of authorities cited by plaintiff are easily distin-
guishable because they involve cases where it was impossible to 
repair the damaged vehicle or where repairs were defective. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I - STATE FARM'S LIABILITY UNDER THE INSURANCE 
POLICY IS LIMITED TO THE COST OF REPAIRING PLAINTIFF'S 
VEHICLE. 
The simple issue in this case, as recognized by plaintiff, 
is whether the State Farm insurance policy extends coverage for 
diminution in value. This is purely an issue of policy construc-
tion to be resolved by the language of the insurance policy 
itself. The interpretation of a contract is a question of la\* 
for the court. See Morris v. Mountain States Tel, and Tel. Co., 
658 P.2d 1199, 1200-1201 (Utah 1983). 
The insurance contract at issue plainly and unambiguously 
states up front that the limit of State Farm's liability for loss 
to plaintiff's vehicle is the lower of the "actual cash value" of 
the vehicle or the "cost of repair or replacement" of the 
vehicle. The policy defines "actual cash value" and "cost of 
repair or replacement" and gives State Farm the right to elect 
which of those two measures of damages it will employ: 
6 
Limit of Liability -
Comprehensive and Collision Coverages 
The limit of our liability for loss to 
property or any part of it is the lower of: 
1. the actual cash value, or 
2. the cost of repair or replacement. 
Actual cash value is determined by the 
market value, age and condition at the time 
the loss occurred. Any deductible amount that 
applies is then subtracted. The cost of 
repair or replacement is based upon: 
1. the cost of repair agreed upon by you 
and us, or the lower of: 
a. a competitive bid approved by us, or 
b. an estimate written based upon the 
prevailing competitive price. The 
prevailing competitive price means 
labor rates, parts prices and 
material prices charged by a 
substantial number of the repair 
facilities in the area where the 
car is to be repaired as determined 
by a survey made by us. If you 
ask, we will identify some 
facilities that will perform the 
repairs at the prevailing competi-
tive price. 
Any deductible amount that applies is then 
subtracted. 
Settlement of Loss -
Comprehensive and Collision Coverages 
We have the right to settle a loss with vou or 
the owner of the property in one of the fol-
lowing ways: 
1. pay up to the actual cash value; 
2. pay to repair or replace the property 
or part with like kind and quality. 
Addendum, Insurance Contract (emphasis added). 
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The policy language quoted above plainly and unambiguously 
limits State Farm's liability to "the lower of . . . the actual 
cash value, or . . . the cost of repair or replacement." Id, It 
is hard to imagine a less ambiguous way to express this limita-
tion. The limitation is made effective by additional language 
giving State Farm the right to elect either the "cash value" or 
"cost of repair" measure of damages. Inasmuch as the cost of 
repairing plaintiff's vehicle was lower than the vehicle's 
alleged pre-accident cash value, State Farm properly chose to 
discharge its obligation by restoring plaintiff's vehicle to its 
original physical condition. State Farm did not breach the 
insurance contract by selecting the "cost of repair" as the 
measure of damages, as recognized by the trial court. 
Plaintiff asserts repeatedly in his brief that the State 
Farm policy requires State Farm to pay plaintiff for the alleged 
diminution in value to his vehicle. However, most of plaintiff's 
assertions are made without any citation to or quotation of the 
insurance contract. It is not until the very end of plaintiff's 
brief that plaintiff makes an attempt to show how the insurance 
contract supports plaintiff's position. This attempt is found in 
a single paragraph that is confusing and difficult to understand. 
Plaintiff is apparently alleging that the phrase "repair or 
replace with like kind and quality" means that the insurer must 
repair the value of the vehicle, rather than the physical damage: 
The language in the policy which requires an 
insurer to "repair or replace" the damaged 
automobile with "like kind or quality" . . . 
certainly means that the purpose of the 
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policy is to compensate the insured for any 
loss or damage, less the deductible. If the 
vehicle cannot be repaired so that it is 
worth what it was before the accident, then 
it needs to be replaced. It appears that 
the trial court in this case focused on the 
concept of replacing "parts and components 
with like kind and quality." . . . The 
vehicle must be looked at as a whole and not 
as constituent parts and components. 
Appellants Brief, pp. 7-8. 
Plaintiffs argument that "repair or replace" means a repair 
of value rather than a repair of physical damage is not supported 
by the language of the insurance contract. As previously quoted, 
the insurance contract limits State Farm's liability to the 
lesser of "the actual cash value" of the damaged vehicle, or "the 
cost of repair or replacement." The phrase "actual cash value" 
is defined in the policy as the market value of the vehicle at 
the time of the accident, less the deductible, which is the 
measure of damages plaintiff is seeking in this case. The phrase 
"cost of repair or replacement" is defined by the policy as 
follows: 
the cost of repair agreed upon by you and us, 
or the lower of; 
a. a competitive bid approved by us, or 
b. an estimate written based upon the 
prevailing competitive price. The 
prevailing competitive price means 
labor rates, parts prices and material 
prices charged by a substantial number 
of the repair facilities in the area 
where the car is to be repaired as 
determined by a survey made by us. If 
you ask, we will identify some 
facilities that will perform the 
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repairs at the prevailing competitive 
price. 
Any deductible amount that applies is then 
subtracted. 
Addendum, Insurance Contract (emphasis added). 
As demonstrated, the phrase "cost of repair or replacement" 
is defined as the cost of repairing the actual physical damage to 
plaintiff's vehicle. The phrase does not require State Farm to 
restore the vehicle to its previous "cash value." That is only 
required under the "cash value" measure of damages. Plaintiff is 
attempting to turn the "cost of repair" formula into the "cash 
value" formula. Under plaintiff's interpretation of the 
insurance contract, State Farm's clear contractual right to 
repair or replace the damaged vehicle would be effectively 
removed and all language pertaining to such a right would be 
rendered meaningless and superfluous. 
Courts guard against a party's attempt to create an 
ambiguity in an unambiguous contract by employing the rule that 
insurance policies must be considered as a whole, and not in 
piecemeal fashion. See Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1107-
08 (Utah 1982). When the relevant portions of the insurance 
contract at issue are constructed as a whole, it is readily 
apparent that State Farm's liability is limited to the lesser of 
the cost of repairing plaintiff's vehicle or the diminution in 
value to the vehicle. Plaintiff's creative interpretation of the 
insurance policy is simply an attempt to create an ambiguity 
where none exists. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has held that "policy terms are not 
necessarily ambiguous simply because one party seeks to endow 
them with a different interpretation according to his or her own 
interests." Alf v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 
1274-75 (Utah 1993). The court should not construe the insurance 
policy "through the magnifying eye of the technical lawyer." 
Drauahon v. Cuna Mut. Ins. Soc'y, 771 P.2d 1105, 1108 (Utah App. 
1989) . The trial court recognized this principle and correctly 
held that the insurance policy at issue is "clear and unambig-
uous." (Addendum, Order on Summary Judgment). See Alf, 8 50 P.2d 
at 1274 ("whether an ambiguity exists in a contract is a question 
of law."). This ruling was correct and should be affirmed. 
Also, the court should note that the insurance policy at 
issue in this case was a preprinted contract that was filed with 
the Insurance Commissioner. As pointed out by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Allen v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798 
(Utah 1992) , under the Utah Code "the commissioner may disapprove 
a preprinted policy at any time if it is found to be inequitable, 
unfairly discriminatory, misleading, deceptive, obscure, or 
encourages misrepresentation." Id. at 804 (quotations and 
citations omitted). Consequently, "the validity of preprinted 
insurance contracts is premised on executive approval." Id. In 
such situations the court adheres to "the principle of deferring 
to legislative policy in considering the facial validity of 
insurance provisions." Id. at 805. The court thus enforces 
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insurance policies as written, unless they are clearly contrary 
to public policy, 
POINT II - THE MAJORITY RULE ALLOWS INSURERS TO DIS-
CHARGE THEIR CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS BY FULLY REPAIRING 
A DAMAGED VEHICLE AND RETURNING THE VEHICLE TO ITS 
ORIGINAL PHYSICAL CONDITION. 
Plaintiff apparently argues that State Farm must elect the 
"cash value" measure of damages, rather than the "cost of repair 
or replacement" measure authorized by contract. Because the 
insurance policy does not support his argument, plaintiff cites 
to cases from other jurisdictions. Such an attempt is of little 
value. This case involves a contractual dispute where the 
rights, duties, and obligations of the parties are governed by 
the terms of the contract. The duties of the parties are not 
established by cases from other jurisdictions. 
In any event, many of the authorities relied upon by plain-
tiff are easily distinguishable because they involve situations 
where it was impossible to repair the vehicle or where repairs 
were undertaken, but performed in a defective manner. See 
Venable v. Import Volkswagen, Inc., 519 P.2d 667, 670 (Kan. 
1974); Annotation, 43 A.L.R.2d 327 (1955). Quite obviously, in 
situations where physical repairs are impossible or defective an 
insurer cannot discharge its obligations by having the vehicle 
repaired. See Venable, 519 P.2d at 672. However, where repairs 
are possible and do substantially return the vehicle to its 
former physical condition, as in the instant case, the majority 
of courts routinely allow insurers to discharge their obligations 
by electing to repair the damaged vehicle: 
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It is generally held or recognized, under 
insurance contracts similar to the one in 
the present case, that when a damaged 
automobile cannot be repaired, it is a total 
loss, and the liability of the insurer is 
the difference in the actual cash value of 
the car immediately before and after the 
accident, less the amount stipulated in the 
deductible clause. On the other hand, if 
the automobile is not a total loss and can 
be repaired, the liability of the insurer is 
to pay only the cost of repairs, less the 
amount provided for in the deductible 
clause, 
Bickel v. Nationwide Hut. Ins, Co,, 143 S.E.2d 903, 905 (Va. 
1965) (emphasis added). See also Ray v. Farmers Ins, Exchange, 
246 Cal.Rptr. 593, 596 (Cal. App. 1988) (Where repair substan-
tially restores vehicle to its original physical condition, 
insurer's liability is limited to repair costs and insurer is not 
liable for diminution in value); Brooks v. Capital Fleets, 123 
A.2d 916, 917 (D.C. App. 1956) ("Where damages to an automobile 
are such that they may reasonably be repaired, restoring the 
vehicle to substantially its condition prior to the injury, the 
measure of damage is the fair and reasonable cost of repairs."); 
National Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Watson, 298 P.2d 762, 
766-67 (Okla. 1956) (If damaged vehicle can be substantially 
restored to its original physical condition, measure of insurer's 
liability is the cost of repairs; otherwise the measure of 
liability is the diminished value of the vehicle); National Auto. 
Ins. Co. v. Dalton. 214 S.W.2d 507, 509 (Ark. 1948) (Insurer's 
liability is limited to repair costs unless the repairs are 
performed in a defective manner, in which case the insurer's 
liability becomes the diminished value of the vehicle.). 
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On page 5 of his brief, plaintiff quotes 15 Couch On 
Insurance 2nd § 54:30 (2nd ed. 1983). The language quoted by 
plaintiff supports the majority view that an insurer can 
discharge its obligation by repairing a damaged vehicle where 
repairs are possible. This is supported by additional statements 
from the same treatise that were not quoted by plaintiff: 
It is not uncommon for a contract of 
property insurance to give the insurer the 
option to repair, restore, or replace the 
damaged property in lieu of paying for the 
insured loss. Such a condition is valid . . 
. . fid, at § 54:10). 
* * * 
In harmony with the foregoing, an automobile 
collision policy provision that the limit of 
liability shall not exceed the actual cash 
value of the automobile or what it would 
cost to repair or replace the automobile 
with another of like kind and quality . . . 
gives the insurer the right to repair the 
automobile if it can be repaired and placed 
in substantially the same condition as 
before. . . . (Id. at § 54:29). 
* * * 
Where the insurer exercises its option and 
properly repairs or rebuilds thereunder, 
such performance is a defense to any action 
on the policy. (Id. at § 54:33 (emphasis 
added)). 
Utah apparently follows the majority rule detailed above and 
allows an insurer to elect to repair a damaged vehicle when re-
pairs can restore the vehicle to its original physical condition. 
This is evidenced by the holding of the Utah Supreme Court in 
Sew v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co.. 334 P.2d 554 (Utah 1959): 
Generally, car damage is determinable by 
expert testimony as to repair cost, or by 
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showing the differential in market value 
before and after the incident initiating the 
damage• 
Id. 
Plaintiff's brief implies that most jurisdictions only allow 
an insurer to elect the "cash value" measure of damages and cites 
to Section 4 of 43 A.L.R.2d 327 (1955) in support of this propo-
sition. However, plaintiff fails to point out that the cases 
cited in Section 4 only applied the "cash value" formula because 
repairs to the vehicle were impossible or defective. Plaintiff 
also fails to mention Section 3 of that same annotation, which 
cites a greater number of instances where courts applied the 
"cost of repair or replacement" formula because the physical 
damage was repairable. 
In the instant case it is undisputed that the physical 
damage to plaintiff's vehicle was fully and competently repaired. 
As a result, the appropriate measure of State Farm's liability 
is the cost associated with the vehicle's repair. This is 
evidenced by numerous authorities. 
In Johnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 754 P.2d 330 
(Ariz. App. 1988) State Farm elected to repair the plaintiff's 
damaged vehicle. The repairs were not defective in any way. 
Nonetheless, the plaintiff demanded an additional $3,000 payment 
from State Farm for alleged diminution in value to her vehicle. 
State Farm denied the claim on the grounds that State Farm's 
liability was limited under the policy to the cost of repairing 
the plaintiff's vehicle. The insurance policy at issue was the 
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same State Farm policy at issue in the instant case. The 
Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment for State Farm, 
finding that the State Farm policy was not ambiguous and did not 
extend coverage for diminution in value: 
[N]owhere in the policy does there appear 
any language which requires State Farm 
either to restore the vehicle to its pre-
accident condition or to pay the insured the 
difference in value after the accident as 
opposed to before. We also do not find any 
ambiguous language in the provision at 
issue. 
A review of the cases cited convinces us 
that the better view is that State Farm's 
liability is limited by the terms of the 
policy to the cost of repairing the vehicle 
less any deductible payable by the insured. 
* * * 
We note that many of the cases fplaintiff 1 
has cited to us involved different facts 
than the case before us. In several of the 
cases, the parties disputed the extent of 
damages and repairs required so that no 
repairs had yet been made, or there was a 
claim that the repairs made were defective. 
Id. at 331 (emphasis added). 
The Johnson court also recognized that any award for 
diminution in value would, in essence, rewrite the State Farm 
policy so as to arbitrarily remove State Farm's right of 
election: 
We agree with the trial court that under the 
provisions of the insurance contract and the 
evidence here, plaintiff's measure of damages is 
not the difference in the market value of the 
automobile immediately before and after the 
collision. The contract of insurance does not so 
provide. To apply such measure of damages would 
be arbitrarily reading out of the policy the 
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right of defendant to make repairs, or replace 
the damaged part with materials of like kind and 
gualify. 
Id. at 3 31 (quoting Bickel v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 143 
S.E.2d 903 (Va. 1965) (emphasis added)). 
A similar "diminution in value" claim was made under a 
substantively identical policy in Ray v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 
246 Cal.Rptr. 593 (Cal. App. 1988). In that case the plaintiff's 
vehicle was damaged by a UPS truck. The plaintiff made a demand 
for coverage against UPS7 insurer, Liberty Mutual, and against 
his own insurer, Farmers Insurance Exchange. Both insurers 
agreed to have the vehicle repaired, but both refused to pay 
plaintiff for the alleged diminution in value to his vehicle. At 
trial evidence was introduced that the market value of vehicles 
that have undergone significant repair is always less than the 
market value of vehicles that have never been damaged. When 
judgment was rendered against the plaintiff, he appealed to the 
California Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed, 
finding that the insurance policy was not ambiguous, that the 
policy did not extend coverage for diminution in value when 
repairs could restore the vehicle to its original physical 
condition, and that the court could not award "diminution in 
value" damages without rewriting the insurance contract: 
The policy unambiguously gave Farmers the 
right to elect to repair fplaintiff'si 
vehicle if the cost to repair . . . was less 
than the actual cash value of the vehicle at 
the time of loss. 
* * * 
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As a practical matter, one may assume that 
any automobile sustaining significant 
collision damage will lose some market value 
after repairs. To hold Farmers liable for 
the automobile's diminution in value would 
make Farmers an insurer of the automobile's 
cash value in virtually all cases and would 
render essentially meaningless its clear 
right to elect to repair rather than to pay 
the actual cash value of the vehicle at the 
time of loss. 
* * * 
The policy language unambiguously reserves 
to Farmers the right to elect the most 
economical method of paving claims. 
[Plaintiff's] strained interpretation would 
gut that right and hold Farmers to a risk it 
did not contemplate nor one for which 
[plaintiff] paid. 
* * * 
We will not rewrite an otherwise unambiguous 
limitation of collision coverage to provide 
for a risk not bargained for. To the extent 
fplaintiff'si automobile was repaired to its 
pre-accident safe, mechanical, and cosmetic 
condition. Farmers' obligation under the 
policy of insurance to repair to "like kind 
and quality" was discharged. 
Id. at 595-96 (emphasis added, citations and quotations omitted). 
In Uniguard Ins. Co. v. Wish. 496 S.W.2d 392 (Ark. 1973), 
the court issued a similar holding. In that case the plaintiff 
rejected his insurer's offer to pay to repair his damaged 
vehicle, claiming that, under the policy, he was entitled to 
recover for the diminution value to his vehicle. The policy 
limited the insurance company's liability to the lesser of the 
actual cash value of the vehicle or the cost of repair. At 
trial, expert testimony was introduced to the effect that "a used 
car on a used car lot that has been wrecked is just not worth as 
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much as another car of the same kind that hasn't been wrecked." 
Id. at 393. However, no evidence was introduced establishing 
that the vehicle could not be repaired. When the trial court 
awarded plaintiff damages for diminution in value, the insurer 
appealed. The Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed the trial 
court, holding that the proper measure of damages is the cost of 
repair, rather than the actual cash value, when the vehicle can 
be restored to its original physical condition: 
In order for the judgment which was entered 
against appellant to have been given, it was 
necessary that the circuit court find that 
the measure of appellee's damages was the 
difference between the value of his automo-
bile immediately before and immediately 
following the accident rather than the cost 
of repairs. We think, under the terms of 
the policy that this finding was erroneous 
and cases cited by appellee are clearly 
distinguishable. 
* * * 
A property damage limitation of liability is 
valid and . . . recovery is dependent upon 
the terms of the contract rather than on the 
difference in the before and after value of 
the vehicle. If [the cash value] figure had 
been equal to or less than the amount neces-
sary to repair the car, appellee could have 
recovered the difference between the before 
and after value. But such is not the case. 
. . . Of course, our finding would be 
different if the testimony reflected the 
[plaintiff's] automobile to have been a 
total loss. But there is no evidence to 
that effect in the record. The only 
evidence on this point by appellee's 
witnesses was that a wrecked automobile 
which had been repaired was never as 
valuable for re-sale purposes as one which 
had not been wrecked. Not a single person 
testified that the care was a total loss. 
Id. at 394, 395 (emphasis added). 
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Another case reaching the same result is General Accident 
Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Judd. 400 S.W.2d 685 (Ky. App. 
1966) . In Judd the plaintiff was also claiming damages for 
diminution in value to her vehicle under a policy that limited 
the insurer's liability to the lesser of the actual cash value of 
the vehicle or the cost of repair. The trial court gave the jury 
an instruction authorizing the jury to award plaintiff damages 
based upon the cash value of her vehicle, rather than the cost of 
repair, even though there was no evidence establishing that the 
vehicle could not be repaired. This was held to be reversible 
error: 
There was no evidence whatever that plain-
tiff's automobile could not have been . . . 
restored. It may be true, as an automobile 
dealer testified, that a car that has been 
wrecked can never be fully restored to its 
market value before the accident, but the 
insurance contract does not require a 
restoration of value: it requires only a 
restoration of physical condition. 
* * * 
In concluding, it occurs to us that the 
first and fundamental question for 
submission to the jury in this case is 
whether plaintiff's automobile could have 
been restored in substantially as good 
physical or operating condition as before 
the accident. . . . If so, plaintiff has no 
cause of action, since the [insurance] 
company offered her [the cost of repair]. 
Id. at 687-88 (underlining added). 
The same results have been reached in other cases. See 
e.g. , Hounihan v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. , 441 S.W.2d 58 
(Mo. App. 1969) ("Policy provisions similar to those [in the 
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instant case] . . . limit the insurer's liability and fix the 
maximum recovery which can be had under the policy. 
[Defendant] was entitled to show that the cost of a replacement 
was less than the amount claimed by plaintiff to be the diminu-
tion in value. . . . " ) ; Riley v. National Auto Ins. Co. , 77 
N.W.2d 241 (Neb. 1956) (Where the insurance policy limited the 
insurer's liability to the lesser of cash value or cost of repair 
and gave the insurer an election between the two measures of 
damages, and where there was evidence that the plaintiff's 
damaged vehicle could be substantially repaired, it was error for 
the trial court to instruct the jury to apply the "cash value" 
measure of damages.). 
As the preceding authorities demonstrate, the majority of 
courts recognize and uphold as valid a provision in an insurance 
policy that limits the liability of the insurer to the lesser of 
the cash value of the vehicle or the cost of repair. In conjunc-
tion with this limitation, the courts also enforce and uphold 
provisions giving the insurer an election between the "cash 
value" and "cost of repair" measure of damages. The only time 
that the majority of courts refuse to enforce the insurer's right 
of election is when the damaged vehicle cannot be substantially 
restored to its original physical condition. A number of the 
authorities relied upon by plaintiff fall into this latter 
category, and thus do not support plaintiff's position, but 
rather support the majority view. See Venable v. Import 
Volkswagen, Inc.. 519 P.2d 667, 670-71 (Kan. 1974); 15 Couch On 
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Insurance 2d § 54:30 (2d ed. 1983); Annot. 43 A.L.R.2d 327 
Section 4 (1955). 
The principal case relied upon by plaintiff is Delledonne v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co,. 621 A.2d 350 (Del. Super. Ct. 
1992). Delledonne's value as precedent is lessened by the fact 
that it is not the decision of an appellate court, but rather is 
a published trial court opinion. Delledonne's persuasive value 
is further lessened by the fact that the cases it relies upon are 
all either miscited or distinguishable. While Delledonne 
suggests that the majority of jurisdictions require an insurer to 
pay for diminution in value even when a vehicle can be repaired, 
this is simply untrue. Most of the cases cited by Delledonne 
actually involved situations where the vehicle could not be 
restored to its original physical condition or where repairs were 
defective, and thus are consistent with the majority rule. See 
Dodson Aviation v. Rollins, 807 P.2d 1319 (Kan. App. 1991); 
Venable. 519 P.2d at 672-73; Rossier v. Union Auto. Ins. Co., 291 
P. 498, 500 (Or. 1930). The remaining two cases cited in 
Delledonne are distinguishable by the fact that neither of the 
insurance policies in those cases defined the phrase "cost of 
repair or replacement," and consequently the courts interpreted 
that phrase to mean that the insurer had to repair the value of 
the damaged vehicle, rather than the actual property damage. See 
Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Cope, 448 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Texas 
App. 1969); Campbell v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 109 S.E.2d 572 
(S.C. 1959) . Plaintiff's brief actually quotes a portion of the 
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Campbell case. In the instant case the phrase "cost of repair or 
replacement" is defined in the insurance policy so as to elimi-
nate any ambiguity and to clearly establish that the phrase only 
refers to the repair of physical damage. Delledonne thus consti-
tutes questionable support for plaintiff's position. 
The majority of courts adhere to contractual language 
limiting the insurer's liability to the lesser of the actual cash 
value of the vehicle or the cost of repair. Plaintiff's argument 
goes against this majority rule. Plaintiff's argument also 
destroys an insurer's right to limit the scope of its coverage, 
a right which has been preserved to insurers by the Utah Supreme 
Court: 
An insurer has the right to contract with an 
insured as to the risks it will or will not 
assume, as long as neither statutory law nor 
public policy is violated. Thus an insurer 
may include in a policy any number or kind 
of exceptions and limitations to which an 
insured will agree unless contrary to 
statute or public policy. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Call, 712 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 
1985). 
Public policy concerns also demand that plaintiff's argument 
be rejected. It is undisputed that plaintiff's vehicle has been 
fully restored to its original physical condition. There are no 
cosmetic or mechanical defects. Consequently, it necessarily 
follows that the future life of plaintiff's vehicle has not been 
diminished and that plaintiff should have the use of his vehicle 
for the same amount of time that he would have been able to use 
the vehicle prior to the accident. If plaintiff now prevails in 
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his argument and successfully recovers the $15,000 that he is 
demanding from State Farm, plaintiff will have received a wind-
fall. In addition to having the full use of his vehicle over the 
normal life of the vehicle, plaintiff will have received 
additional money for his own use and benefit. In essence, State 
Farm will be subsidizing plaintiff's purchase of the automobile. 
Such an approach provides insureds with an incentive to damage 
their vehicles and contradicts public policy. 
CONCLUSION 
The insurance contract entered into by the parties plainly 
and unambiguously limits State Farm's liability to the lower of 
the actual cash value of plaintiff's vehicle or the cost of 
repairing plaintiff's vehicle. State Farm elected to repair the 
vehicle and fully restored the vehicle to its original physical 
condition, thereby discharging its obligation under the contract. 
While plaintiff claims that the policy requires State Farm to 
elect the "cash value" measure of damages, plaintiff's argument 
is not supported by the plain language of the insurance contract. 
The trial court thus properly dismissed plaintiff's complaint. 
Because the insurance contract does not support plaintiff's 
argument, plaintiff instead cites to cases from other jurisdic-
tions. These cases are irrelevant. The responsibilities and 
duties of the parties are determined by the provisions of the 
insurance contract. The court cannot rule in plaintiff's favor 
without re-writing the contract. If the court does consider case 
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law, the court should follow the rule of a majority of courts and 
uphold the coverage limitation. 
Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim against State 
Farm for breach of contract. State Farm's liability under the 
contract was discharged when State Farm fully repaired plain-
tiff's vehicle. The trial court recognized this and properly 
awarded summary judgment to defendant. The trial court's 
decision should be affirmed, 
DATED this c?7^7 day of ^&^tf Jdsf^t??^^ , 1994 
*afrl M. Belnap 
rDavid R. Nielson 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
206073nh 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
E. MARLOW GOBLE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY ] 
COMPANY, 
Defendant. ] 
| ORDER 
I Civil 
i Judge 
ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
No. 930000023 
Clinton s. Judkins 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on December 
14, 1993, on the cross motions for summary judgment filed by the 
parties before the Honorable Clinton S. Judkins, 
The court reviewed the memoranda submitted by counsel and 
having heard the arguments of counsel and there being no disputed 
material issues of fact, the court is of the opinion that the 
terms and conditions of the State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance policy in Section IV—Physical Damage Coverages, and in 
particular, under the terms and conditions of said policy under 
the provisions of "Limit of Liability—Comprehensive and 
Collision Coverages" and "Settlement of Loss—Comprehensive and 
Collision Coverages" are clear and unambiguous. 
The court determines that the settlement of the loss was 
appropriately concluded by State Farm in accordance with the 
terms and provisions of the insurance policy in repairing the 
vehicle with parts and components of like kind and quality. 
Therefore, it is 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the motion of 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company for summary 
judgment is hereby granted and the motion of the plaintiff is 
hereby denied and judgment is granted in favor of the defendant 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company dismissing the 
claims of the plaintiff, with prejudice, 
DATED this 3 ^ d a y of F ^ v ^ ^ w ^ , 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
S/ CLINT S.JUDKIMS 
C l i n t ^ s . Judkins 
F i r s t D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
Approved^as to Form: 
SECTION l\ PHYSICAL DAMAGE COVERAGE 
Loss - means, when used in this section, each direct and Clothes and 
accidental loss of or damage to: Coverages 
1. your car; 
2. its equipment which is common to the use of your 
car as a vehicle; or 
3. clothes and luggage insured; and 
4. a detachable living quarters attached or removed 
from your car for storage. Detachable living 
quarters includes its body and items securely fixed 
in place as a permanent part of the body. Kwmust 
have told us about the living quarters before the loss 
and paid any extra premium needed 
COMPREHENSIVE - COVERAGE D. You have this 
coverage if **DH appears in the "Coverages" space on the 
declarations page. If a deductible applies, the amount is 
shown by the number beside **DW. 
1. Loss to Your Car. We will pay for bss to yo urcar 
m EXCEPT LOSSBY COLt/5/O/Vbutonlyfoxthe 
amount of each such bss u excess of the deductible 
amount, if any. 
Breakage of glass, or bss caused by missiles, falling 
objects, fire, theft, larceny, explosion, earthquake, 
windstorm, hail, water, flood, malicious mischief or 
vandalism, riot or civil commotion, is payable 
under this coverage. Loss due to hitting or being-
hit by a bird or an animal is payable under this 
coverage. 
2/ . We will repay you for transportation costs if your 
car is stolen. We will pay up to $16 per day for the 
period that begins 48 hours after jw< tell us of the 
theft. The penod ends when we offer to pay for 
bss. 
COLUSION - 80% - COVERAGE F. You have this 
coverage if " P appears in the •'Coverages*' space on the 
declarations page. 
We wQl pay 80% of the first $250 and 100% over that 
amount ofbssioyour car caused by collision. K the collision 
is with another motor vehicle insured by us, we will pay 
100% of the to*. 
COLUSION - COVERAGE G. You have this coverage 
if aG" appears in the "Coverages" space on the declarations 
page. The deductible amount is shown by the number beside 
**cr. 
We wiH pay for bss to your car caused by coUisbn but only 
for the amount of each such bss in excess of the deductible 
amount If the couTson is with another motor vehicle 
insured with us, j w d o not pay jwtr deductible if it is S100 
or less as we pay it 
ColBsbn - means your car upset or hit or was hit by a 
vehicle or other object 
Luggage - Comprehensive and Collision 
We will pay for bss to clothes and luggage owned by the 
first person named in the declarations, his or her spouse, and 
their relatives. These items have to be in or on your car. 
Your car has to be covered under this policy fon 
1. Comprehensive, and the bss .caused by fire,' 
lightning, flood, falling objects, explosion, 
earthquake or theft If the bss is due to theft, 
YOUR ENTIRE CAR MUST HAVE BEEN 
STOLEN; or 
2. Collision, and the bss caused by cotEsbru 
We will pay up to S200 for bss to clothes and luggage in 
excess of any deductible amount shown for comprehensive 
or collision. S200 is the most we win pay in any one 
occurrence even though mote than one person has a bss. 
This coverage is excess over any other coverage. 
Limit of liability - Comprehensive and Collision Coverages 
The limit of our liability for bss to property or any part of 
it is the lower of: 
1. the actual cash value, or 
2. the cost of repair or replacement 
Actual cash value is determined by the market value, age 
and condition at the time the bss occurred Any deductible 
amount that applies is then subtracted The cost of repair 
or replacement is based upon: 
1. the cost of repair agreed upon by you and us, or 
2. the lower of: 
a." a competitive bid approved by us, or . 
b. an estimate written based upon the prevailing 
competitive price. The prevailing competitive 
price means labor rates, parts prices and 
material prices charged by a substantial 
number or the repair facilities in the area where 
the car is to be repaired as determined by a 
survey made by us. It you ask, we will identify 
some facilities that will perform the repairs at 
the prevailing competitive price. 
Any deductible amount that applies is then subtracted. 
Settlement of Loss - Comprehensive and Coffiskm 
Coverages 
We have the right to settle a bss with jw/ or the owner of 
the property in one of the following ways: 
I. pay up to the actual cash value: 
1 pay to repair or replace the property or part with 
like kind and quality. If the repair or replacement 
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